Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1988

Larry Horton v. The Royal Order of the Sun and
Concept Clubs : Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kathryn Schuler Denhom; Attorney for Plaintiff.
Lee Anne Walker; Virginia Curtis Lee; Shawn E. Draney; Snow Christensen and Martineau;
Attorney for Defendant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Horton v. The Royal Order of the Sun and Concept Clubs, No. 880490.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2405

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

KF'J
45.9
.S9
DOCKET NO.

BRIEF

ttOfMO

Iff THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LARRY HORTON,
Plaintiff/Appellant
v.

THE ROYAL ORDER OF THE SUN,
a Utah non-profit corporation
and STUDEBAKER'S, a Utah nonprofit corporation,

Case No. 880490
Priority:

14(b)

THIRD DISTRICT COURT
Case No. C 87-7579

Defendants/Appellees

BRIEF OF APPELLEE THE ROYAL ORDER OF THE SUN
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE
LEE ANNE WALKER
Attorney for Defendant
The Royal Order of the Sun
65 West Century Park Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
(801) 486-8331
VIRGINIA CURTIS LEE
Attorney on Appeal for Defendant
The Royal Order of the Sun
1458 Princeton Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105-1923
(801) 583-0625
SHAWN E. DRANEY
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
Studebaker's
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
(801) 521-9000
KATHRYN SCHULER DENHOLM
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
263 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
(801) 484-0091

OCT 1

iwu

Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

TABLE QF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
JURISDICTION STATEMENT
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
L.

Nature of the Case

B.

Course of Proceedings

CL

Disposition in the Lower Court

P.

Statement of Relevant Facts

....

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
POINT I: HORTON'S COMPLAINT WAS LEGALLY
INSUFFICIENT TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST STUDEBAKER'S AND THE SUN
POINT II: AS A MATTER OF LAW, A VOLUNTARILY
INTOXICATED ADULT HAS NO CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST A DRAMSHOP FURNISHING
ANY ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE

A_

The Utah Legislature Has Created No
Statutory Remedy Altering The Common
Law Rule That One Injured As The
Result Of His Own Voluntary

Intoxication Has No Cause Qf Action
Against A Provider Qf Alcohol . . . .

i

B.

When It Enacted Section 32A-12-9.

U,C.A, (1986), The Legislature Had
No Specific Intent To Provide A
Right Qf Action Against A Dramshop
To An Intoxicated Adult Injured As

The Result Qf His Qwn Voluntary
Inebriation
CONCLUSION

19
23

ADDENDUM

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134.
12

763 P. 2d 806 (Utah 1988)
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d
413 (Utah 1986)
Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685
(Utah 1989)
Cuevas v. Roval D'lherville Hotel. 498
So. 2d 346 (Miss. 1986)

Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irr. Co., 793
P.2d 897 (Utah 1990)
Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah
1981)
Heiner v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co.,
790 P.2d 107 (Utah App. 1990)

15, 16
15

22
7

19, 21
7

Jorgenson v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80
(Utah App. 1987)

19

Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d
845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1976)

24

Knapstad v. Smith's Management Corp.,
774 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1989)

21

Lowe v. Sorenson. 779 P.2d 668
(Utah 1989)

6, 7

Miller v. City of,Portland a.k.a
Citv of Portland v. Alhadeff.
288 Or. 271, 604 P. 2d 1261 (1980)
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co..
773 P.2d 405 (Utah App. 1989)
Safer v. McClenden. 650 P.2d 1002
(Or. App. 1982)
iii

16, 17, 20
7
17, 18

Tovar v. Lee, Civil No. 84-1540
(10th Cir. 1984)

23

Statutes and Rules
Rule 12(b), U.R.C.P
Section 32-11-1, Utah Code Ann* (1931)
(repealed 1985)
Section 32A-12-9, Utah Code Ann. (1986)

11,
21, 22,

Section 32A-12-13.3, Utah Code Ann.
(19b6)
Section 32A-14-1, Utah Code Ann.
(1986)

8

Authorities
64 A.L.R. 3d 882, Proof of Causation of
Intoxication as a Prerequisite to Recovery
under Civil Damage Act

8

45 Am. Jur. 2d Intoxicating Liquors
§ 553, pp. 852-853
45 Am. Jur. 2d Intoxicating Liquors
§ 561, p. 859

10,

45 Am. Jur. 2d Intoxicating Liquors
§ 580, pp. 871-872
1987 Utah L. Rev. 304, Utah Dram Shop
Act Amendments

iv

13,

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
)

LARRY HORTON,

Plaintiff/Appellant

)

V.

,

THE ROYAL ORDER OF THE SUN,
a Utah non-profit corporation
and STUDEBAKER'S, a Utah nonprofit corporation,

Defendants/Appellees

j>
;
]>
]
)
))

Case No. 880490
Priority:

14(b)

THIRD DISTRICT COURT
Case No. C 87-7579

BRIEF OF APPELLEE THE ROYAL ORDER OF THE SUN

JURISDICTION STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court
this

case pursuant

(1988), "orders,
over which

to

Section

has appellate jurisdiction over
78-2-2(3)(j),

judgments, and decrees

Utah

of any court

Code

Ann.

of record

the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate

jurisdiction."
NATURE QF THE PROCEEDINGS
This
Prejudice and
Third

District

Horton's action

is an

appeal from

the Order

upon the Merits entered
Court,
against

Salt

of

Dismissal with

November 16, 1988

Lake County

dismissing

Appellees Studebaker's

and

in the

Appellant
the

Royal

Order of

the Sun

("Sun") for

injuries Horton

suffered as

the

result of Horton's voluntary intoxication.

STATEMENT QF THE ISSUES
The sole issue presented
intoxicated
alcohol

adult has a

in this appeal is whether

cause of

action against a

an

provider of

for injuries the intoxicated adult suffers as the result

of the intoxicated adult's voluntary intoxication.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The

following Rules and statutes, cited in this Brief,

are determinative of the issue on appeal:
Rule 12(b)(6), U.R.C.P.
Section

32A-12-9, U.C.A.

(as amended

effective March

17, 1986)
Section 32A-12-13.3 (1986)
Section 32A-14-1 (as amended effective March 17, 1986)
STATEMENT QF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This is

an action for

voluntarily intoxicated

adult

personal injuries brought
against

providers

of

by a

alcoholic

beverages.

B.

Course of Proceedings
On November 19, 1987, Plaintiff/Appellant Larry

("Horton") filed

a

complaint

against
2

providers of

Horton

alcoholic

beverages, Defendants/Appellees, Studebaker's and The Royal Order
of

The Sun ("Sun"), for

personal injuries Horton suffered while

voluntarily intoxicated.

(R. 02-06)

The Sun filed an

Answer and Counterclaim.

Horton filed a Reply to the Sun's Counterclaim.
On October
Dismiss

13, 1988,

Horton's action

asserting

that

an

statutory claim
intoxication.

intoxicated

against a

to

a Motion

Rule 12(b)(6),

person

dramshop for

has

07-08)

(R. 09)

Studebaker's filed

pursuant

(R.

no

to

U.R.C.P.,

common

law or

injuries caused

by his

The Sun joined in Studebaker's Motion

to Dismiss.

(R. 11-26)
On November 7, 1988, the Motions to Dismiss came on for
hearing.

(R. 37, 47)
On

Order

November 16, 1988,

the district court

entered its

of Dismissal with Prejudice and upon the Merits dismissing

Horton's

complaint.

(R.

38-39)

filed his Notice of Appeal.

On December 14,

1988, Horton

(R. 42)

C. Disposition in the Lower Court
Pursuant
district court,

to Minute Entry

by Order

dated November 7,

entered November

Horton's Complaint with prejudice and
39)

3

16, 1988,

upon the merits.

1988, the
dismissed
(R. 38-

EL

Statement of Relevant Facts
For the purpose of appellate review only, the following

facts may be assumed to be true:
1.

The

Sun

and

Studebaker's

are

each

corporations located in Salt Lake County, Utah.
2.

On May

21, 1987,

Horton, as

(R. 02,

a patron,

numerous alcoholic beverages at Studebaker's.

(R„ 02,

3.

Horton became extremely intoxicated.

4.

Studebaker's employees continued to serve

despite his extreme and obvious intoxication.

02,

non-profit
1)
consumed
2)

(R. 02,

(R. 02,

3)

Horton,
4)

5.

Horton left Studebaker's and went to the Sun.

(R.

6.

The employees of the Sun continued to serve Horton

5)

alcoholic beverages despite his obvious and extreme intoxication.
(R. 02,

6)
7.

(R. 02,

Horton passed

out

and fell,

striking his

head.

7)
8.

substantial

Horton

is

permanently

disabled,

medical expenses, and has suffered

and mental anguish.

(R. 02,

has

incurred

a loss of income

s 8, 9, 10 and 11)

SUMMARY QF THE ARGUMENT
Even if the
were

correct,

factual assertions

which Studebaker's
4

and

in Horton's
the Sun

admit

Complaint
only for

purposes of this appeal, those assertions provided no legal basis
for recovery.

In Utah, there is no statutory or common-law cause

of action against a dram

shop by an adult injured as a result of

his own voluntary intoxication.
The Utah Dram Shop Act, which is contrary to the common
law, provides a cause of action against a dram shop "for injuries
in person, property, or means of
to the spouse, child, or

support to any third person, or

parent of that third person,

resulting

from the

intoxication of another person caused by the dram shop.

The Utah

Dram Shop Act

enactment in 1985.
to

has been

However,

amended three times

since its

the legislature has never seen

provide a cause of action to

fit

an adult injured as a result of

his voluntary intoxication, despite a pointed observation by this
Court in a 1986 case.
Horton does not come within the class of persons sought
to

be protected under

which

Title 32A, chapter

provides for criminal

Furthermore, those criminal

12 of

the Utah Code,

enforcement of Utah's
provisions were not

liquor laws.

directed toward

preventing the type of harm Horton suffered as the

result of the

"state of extreme intoxication" he "achieved."
This Court

should affirm

the lower

Dismissal with Prejudice and on the merits.

5

court's Order

of

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
HORTON'S
COMPLAINT WAS
LEGALLY
INSUFFICIENT TO STATE ANY CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST STUDEBAKER'S AND THE
SUN.
Rule 12(b)(6) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim
for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third-party
claim, shall be asserted in the responsive
pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option
of the pleader be made by motion: . . . (6)
failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, . . .

In

LQRQ

669 (Utah 1989),
an appeal

v, Sorenson Research

CQ,»

Inc., 779 P. 2d 668,

this Court set forth the standard

from the grant of a motion

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

of review in

to dismiss under Utah Rule

Justice Zimmerman wrote:

Because this is an appeal from the grant
of a motion to dismiss under Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we will review only
the facts alleged in the complaint.
In
determining whether the trial court properly
granted the motion, we accept the factual
allegations in the complaint as true and
consider them and all reasonable inferences
to be drawn therefrom in a
light most
favorable to the plaintiff.
E.G.. Arrow

Indus, Inc.

y, Zions First

Hat'l Bank, 767

P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988); Penrod v. Nu
Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah
1983).
We will affirm the dismissal only if
it is apparent that as a matter of law, the
plaintiff could not recover under the facts

alleged.

See Arrow Indus. , Inc. v. Z-ions.
6

Eixsi Hat* 1 Bank, 767 P.2d at 936; Barrus v.
Wilkinson. 16 Utah 2d 204, 205, 398 P.2d 207,
208 (1965); Utah
R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
Because we are considering only the legal
sufficiency of the complaint, we give the
trial court's ruling no deference and review
it under a correctness standard.
See Atlas
Corp. v. Clovis Nat*1 Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229
(Utah 1987); Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d
714, 716 (Utah 1985).
See also,
(Utah

folding v.

1990); Heiner v.

Ashley Cent, Irr.
S. J. Groves

Co,, 793 P.2d

& Sons Co..

897, 898

790 P.2d 107,

109-110 (Utah App. 1990); and Mounteer v, Utah Power & Light Co,,
773 P.2d 405, 406 (Utah App. 1989).
The following facts
May

21,

1987, Horton

was

are alleged in the complaint:

a patron

at

Studebaker's.

On

Horton

consumed numerous alcoholic beverages there and

became extremely

intoxicated.

to serve Horton,

Studebaker's employees continued

despite his extreme and obvious intoxication.
Horton then left Studebaker's and went to the Sun.
Sun's

employees continued

despite his

to serve

Horton alcoholic

obvious and extreme intoxication.

The

beverages

While at the Sun,

Horton passed out and fell, striking his head.
Horton

is

permanently

substantial medical expenses,

disabled,

and has suffered a

has

incurred

loss of income

and mental anguish.
According to Horton's own

allegations, he was

injured

when he fell as the result of the "state of extreme intoxication"
7

he

"achieved."

Horton alleged no

that he suffered injury
agent

of Studebaker's or

Studebaker's

or

the

facts supporting an inference

at the hands of any patron,
the Sun.
Sun

Horton did not

caused

the

"state

employee or
allege that
of

extreme

intoxication" he "achieved."
Proof of causation of intoxication is a prerequisite to
recovery under

the dramshop act.

64 A.L.R.3d Proof of Causation

of Intoxication As A Prerequisite To Recovery Under Civil
Ad

882.

Section

32A-14-1, Utah

Code Ann. (1986)

provided in

pertinent part:
(1) Any person who
directly gives,
sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or at a
location
allowing
consumption
on
the
premises,
any alcoholic beverage,
to a
person:
(a) who
21 years or

is under the

age of

(b) who is apparently under
the
influence
of
intoxicating
alcoholic beverages or products or
drugs or
(c) whom
the
person
furnishing the alcoholic beverage
knew or should have known from the
circumstances
was
under
the
influence of intoxicating alcoholic
beverages or products or drugs or
(d) who
is
interdicted person,

a

known

and by those actions causes the intoxication
of that person, is liable for injuries in
8

Damage

person, property, or means of support to any
third person, or to the spouse, child, or
parent of that third person, resulting from
the intoxication. An employer is liable for
the actions of its employees in violation of
this chapter.
(2) A person who suffers an injury
under Subsection (1) has a cause of action
against the person who provided the liquor or
other alcoholic beverage in violation of
Subsection (1).
The

allegations

in

Morton's Complaint

were

legally

insufficient under this statute and under the common law to state
a cause of action against either Studebaker's or the Sun or both.
To

survive a motion

to dismiss,

that add up to a claim.

a complaint must

allege facts

Horton's complaint failed.

The district

court correctly concluded as a

matter of law that Horton

failed

to state a claim against Studebaker's and the Sun.
POINT II,
AS A MATTER OF LAW, A VOLUNTARILY
INTOXICATED ADULT HAS NO CAUSE OF
ACTION
AGAINST
A
DRAMSHOP
FURNISHING ANY ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE.
A. The Utah Legislature Has Created No Statutory Remedy Altering
The Common Law Rule That Qne Injured As The Result Qf His Qwn
Voluntary Intoxication Has No Cause Qf Action Against A Provider
Qf Alcohol.
At common law it is not

a tort to either sell or

give

intoxicating liquor to ordinary able-bodied men, and it has

been

frequently held that in

the absence of statute, there

cause of action against one

can be no

furnishing liquor in favor of
9

those

injured by

the intoxication

reason usually given
liquor, not the
injury.

The

of the

for this rule is

rule is based on

drink it.

45 Am. Jur.

furnished.

The

that the drinking of

furnishing of it, is the

the

proximate cause of the

the obvious fact that

become intoxicated by reason of
not

person so

one cannot

liquor furnished him if he

2d Intoxicating Liquors

does

§ 553, pp.

852-853.
To supply

the defect of the common

practically nothing in the way
caused

by intoxication,

enacted statutes giving,
injured

in

person,

intoxicated person,

law, which affords

of remedies for injury or

the legislatures

of

damage

many states

have

generally, a right of action to persons

property,

or

means

of

support,

by

an

or in consequence of the intoxication of any

person, against the person selling or furnishing the liquor which
caused the

intoxication, in whole or

commonly known as "civil damage

unknown to the connon law.

statutes

are not

New,

separate,

and

These statutes,

acts" or "dramshop acts," afford

renedies

in any

in part.

sense

The remedies created by the

eonmon-law negligence

distinct rights

of

action

actions.

are conferred.

Ibid,, § 561, p. 859.
One
considering

thing that must
such acts is

be constantly borne

that the

right and remedy

in mind when
created by

them are exclusive; no right of action exists except as expressly
10

given by

the

statutes,

and

the remedy

prescribed

enlarged except by further legislative enactnent.
There is authority to the effect that
not within

the contemplation

every spouse,

of a

the purchaser is
a remedy

doctrine of contributory negligence, it

generally held

that

plaintiff

himself

who

furnisher is

contributed

to

the

consequence of which he received injuries.

not

liquor providers

Act").

The

1986.

The Act

in the Utah

legislature amended

Dram Shop
the Act

has been

liable to

intoxication

a
in

Ibid. . § 580, p. 871.

The Utah Legislature first imposed statutory
on

to

Moreover, in an

analogy to the

the liquor

be

Id.

statute giving

child, parent, "or other person."

cannot

act of

liability
1981 ("1981

in 1985 and

applies to vendors and apparently also

again in
to social

hosts serving intoxicating beverages to guests.
The 1981

Act, Utah

Code Ann. §

32-11-1 (Supp.

(repealed 1985), provided in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who
gives,
sells, or otherwise provides intoxicating
liquor to another contrary to subsection 166-13.1(8)(d),
subsection
32-1-36.5(1)(1),
section 32-7-14, or subsection 32-7-24(b) or
(c), and thereby causes the intoxication of
the other person, is liable for injuries in
person, property, or means of support to any
third person, or the spouse, child, or parent
of that third person, resulting from the
intoxication.

11

1981)

(2) A p e r s o n who suffers an injury
referred to in s u b s e c t i o n (1) of this
section, shall have a cause of action against
the intoxicated person and the person who
provided the intoxicating liquor in violation
of subsection (1) above, or either of them.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-13.1(8)(d) (Supp. 1983) (repealed
1985) prohibited

social clubs with state liquor stores on the

premises from selling liquor or wine to minors, persons actually,
apparently, or obviously drunk, any known habitual drunkards, and
any known interdicted persons.
(Supp.

1969)

(repealed

Utah Code Ann. § 32-1-36.5(1)(1)

1985) prohibited

restaurants with state

liquor stores on their premises from selling liquor or wine to
minors, persons
known habitual

actually, apparently, or obviously drunk, any
drunkards, and any known interdicted persons.

Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-14 (1974) (repealed 1985) forbade the sale
or supply of alcoholic beverages to persons under or apparently
under the influence of liquor.
(repealed

1985) prohibited

Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-24 (1974)

(b) the consumption of liquor by a

person apparently under the influence of liquor on the premises
of an owner, tenant, or occupant and (c) the giving of liquor to
a person apparently under the influence of liquor.

See

also

Allisen v. American

806

(Utah

Legion Post

1988) .

12

No.

134, 763 P.2d

The

1986

Amendments

("Amendments") substantially
providers

of

intoxicating

to

the

Utah

altered the

Dram

Shop

liability

beverages.

The

Act

imposed on

1986

Amendments

rectified several problems that existed with the prior version of
the

Act.

The

significant

changes

specific conduct

include

on

(1)

a

which liability

narrower

definition

of the

based, (2)

a limitation on the amount of damages available under

the Dram Shop cause of action, and (3) an
to

certain providers of

beer.

may be

extension of liability

Utah Dram Shop

Act Amendments,

1987 Utah L. Rev. 304-305.
At

common

law,

a

person

consequence of another's intoxication

suffering

had little remedy

the provider of the intoxicating beverage.
the actual

injury

provision
another

as

a

against

The common law viewed

consumption of the beverage, not the provision of the

beverage, as the
any

injury

proximate cause of a person's

resulting

from

of the beverage
person's

that

intoxication,

actual consumer of the beverage.
Dram Shop

intoxication.

could not

beverages owed no duty of care

acts

intoxication and
Because

be the proximate

providers

of

the

cause of

intoxicating

to the public at large or

to the

Ibid. . 305.

are contrary

to

the common

law

and

impose a statutory duty on providers of intoxicating beverages by
holding

them liable

for

the

consequences
13

of

the

consumer's

intoxication.
provider

The acts generally

for personal

resulting

from

provide a remedy

injury or

the

conduct

damage

of

an

to property

intoxicated

otherwise resulting from the intoxication.
The 1986

potential

problem of

defining the conduct on which
The

specific

expressly

acts that

defined

without

the

Dram

Act

or

causation by

narrowly

Shop liability

without

the

eliminate the

Dram Shop liability may be

trigger

in

consumer

address each of

The Amendments largely

liability

interests

Ibid.. 306.

Amendments specifically

problems discussed above.

against the

based.
are

reference

to

now

ninor

regulatory provisions appearing elsewhere in the Code.

Dram Shop

liability

liquor to

is now imposed

anyone (1)

apparently under

from the circumstances was intoxicated, or (4) who is

The

fact that

continued the 1981
persons

determination
was

of age, (2)

of intoxicants, (3) whom the server knew or should

a known interdicted person.

third

person who provides

under twenty-one years

the influence
have known

on any

§

Ibid.. 307-308.
32A-14-1,

Utah

Act's purpose to limit
only

here.

further

Code

Ann.

(1986),

dramshop liability to

supports

the

trial

court's

Certainly, between the time section 32-11-2

enacted in 1981

and its

repeal and reenactment

as section

32A-14-2 in 1985, the legislature had considerable time to review
the effect

and import

of such

language and
14

make any

intended

modifications.

Cf., Brinkerhoff v.

Forsyth, 779 P.2d

685, 116

U.A.R. 23 (Utah 1989).
The Legislature's

purpose to limit

dramshop liability

to third persons only is further illustrated in the 1989 and 1990
amendments to

the

Utah Dram

amendments continue

to limit

despite this Court's
of Utah.

726 P.2d

intoxicated person

Shop Act

(Addendum

liability to

"A").

Those

third persons

only,

pointed observation in Beach

413 (Utah

1986), regarding

from the provider.

v. University

recovery by

In footnote 3

Justice Zimmerman wrote:
3. There is no claim here that the
University furnished alcohol to Beach. It is
uncertain whether such a fact would have made
any difference in this case.
Utah law
prohibits the furnishing of alcohol to a
minor. U.C.A., 1953, § 32A-12-8 (1986 ed. ).
We have held that such a statutory violation
can be used to prove negligence on the part
of the vendor in an action brought by one
injured by the intoxicated minor. Yost v.
Ulaii, 640 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981); SJLS. SJJLQ.
Rees Y, AlbertsorTs, Inc., 587 P.2d 130 (Utah
1978) (intoxicated minor is entitled to have
a determination made as to the seller's
misconduct in providing him with beer in
action for contribution).
Dictum in Yost
suggests, however, that Utah recognizes no
common law right of action against a provider
of alcohol based upon the fact that the
alcohol was furnished in violation of the
law.
640 P.2d at 1046.
If this dictum is
accurate, any liability premised directly on
the illegal furnishing of alcohol would have
to arise from a statutory provision.
The
Utah Dramshop Act, initially enacted in 1981
and repealed and reenacted in 1985, provides
15

the

in Beach.

that one who "gives, sells, or otherwise
provides liquor" to a person under twentyone who becomes intoxicated as a result and
who
injures
another
because
of
the
intoxication is liable to third parties for
damages.
U.C.A., 1953, §32A-14-1 (1986
ed.); sae. 1981 Utah Laws ch. 152.
The
Dramshop Act allows third parties to recover
from those improperly providing liquor, but
does not allow the intoxicated person to
recover from the provider.
Therefore, one
injured as a result of his or her own
voluntary but unlawful intoxication would
appear to be without remedy against the
provider of the alcohol, either under the
Dramshop Act or under common law. Cf. Miller
3L. City of Portland, 288 Or. 271, 279, 604
P.2d 1261, 1264-65 (1980).
726 P.2d at 417.
The principle enunciated earlier in this Brief that the
remedy provided by
further
Miller v.

a dram shop act cannot be

legislative enactment is
Citv of Portland. 288

enlarged except by

highlighted by the
Or. 271, 604

history of

P.2d 1261 (1980),

cited by Justice Zimmerman in Beach, supra.
In Miller. also known as Citv of

Portland v. Alhadeff.

the Oregon Supreme Court held, inter alia.:
This
court
has
never
previously
recognized a common law cause of action in
favor
of a
person who
suffers injury
resulting from his or her own consumption of
alcohol.
Nor have most
other courts.
Because it would be contrary to apparent
legislative policy, we also consider
it
inappropriate to create a common law cause of
action for physical injury to minors caused
by
their illegal purchase
of alcoholic
liquor.
16

604 P.2d at 1265.
Before

Miller was argued

and submitted on

October 1,

1979, the Oregon legislature repealed its original dram shop
and replaced

it with

new legislation

act

effective July 25, 1979.

The original dram shop act, O.R.S. 30.730, had provided:
Any person who shall bargain, sell,
exchange or give to any intoxicated person or
habitual drunkard spirituous, vinous, malt or
intoxicating liquors shall be liable for all
damage resulting
in whole
or in
part
therefrom, in an action brought by the wife,
husband, parent or child of such intoxicated
person or habitual drunkard. The act of any
agent or employe shall be deemed the act of
his principal or employer for the purposes of
this section.
The replacement legislation, O.R.S. 30.950 provides:
No licensee or permittee is liable for
damages incurred or caused by intoxicated
patrons off the licensee's or permittee's
business premises unless the licensee or
permittee has served or provided the patron
alcoholic beverages when such patron was
visibly intoxicated.
In

Sager v. McCIenden.

650 P.2d 1002,

App. 1982), a wrongful death action brought
who died as the

result of a

1003-1004 (Or.

by the wife of a man

fall while intoxicated, the

Court of Appeals held:
tfe read the italicized language [in
O.R.S. 30.950] to mean exactly what it says,
namely, that licensees or permittees are
liable both
for
damages "incurred"
by
intoxicated
persons as well
as damages
17

Oregon

''caused by"
intoxicated
persons.
The
dissenting opinion in construing the above
section appears
either
to overlook
or
disregard the word "incurred."
Furthermore,
the above analysis is consistent with earlier
dictum by this court of this same statutory
language in Johnson v, Paige. 47 Or.App.
1177, 1180 n. 2, 615 P.2d 1185 (1980), a case
brought before the 1979 repeal of the Dram
Shop Act involving a claim by plaintiff for
injuries due to her own intoxication.
In
Johnson we said:
M

We note that H.B. 3152, Section 2,
1979, ORS 30.955, effective July 25,
1979, provides:
" 'No private host is
liable
for
damages
incurred or caused by an
intoxicated social guest
unless the private host
has served or provided
alcoholic beverages to a
social guest when such
guest
was
visibly
intoxicated.'
"The provisions of ORS 30.955,
however, do not apply retroactively
to the instant cause of action
which accrued on October 15, 1976.
This
statute
reaffirms
our
conclusion that liability is now
imposed
where
none
previously
existed."

(Emphasis added.)

In summary, there is absolutely nothing to suggest that
the Utah Legislature has created
common law

rule

that one

a statutory remedy altering the

injured

voluntary intoxication has no cause
of

alcohol.

The

lower

as

the result

of

his

own

of action against a provider

court correctly
18

dismissed

Horton's

Complaint with prejudice and on the merits.

This honorable Court

should affirm the lower court's dismissal.
B,
When Li EmiiLtsd Section 32A-12-9, U.C.A. (1986), Ike.
Legislature Had No Specific Intent To Provide A Right Qf Action
Against A Dramshop To An Intoxicated Adult Injured As The Result
of His Qwn Voluntary Inebriation,
As a
set

by

general rule, violation

a statute

negligence.

or

Hall

ordinance

v. Warren.

is

of a standard
prima

632 P.2d

facie

848,

of safety

evidence

850 (Utah

of

1981).

There, Justice Stewart observed in a footnote:
This Court at an early date held that
violation of a statute or ordinance whose
purpose is to protect life, limb or property
constituted negligence per se. Smith v. Mine
& Smelter S U P P I Y Qo_, 32 Utah 21, 88 P. 683
(1907).
But the rule has undergone an evolution.
Subsequent to Smith. the per se rule was
modified to apply only in cases involving
dangerous
instrumentalities.
White v.
Shipley. 48 Utah 496, 160 P. 441 (1916).
Since the case before us does not concern a
dangerous instrumentality, the prima facie,
rather than
negligence per se
rule is
applicable.
IdL. CJL., Jorgenson

v. Issa,

139 P.2d

80 (Utah

App. 1987),

a

vehicular accident case in which negligence per se was discussed.
However, criminal or regulatory statutes are frequently
enacted to
action

cover

has ever

situations in

which no

been established by

usual situations concerns injuries
19

connon

courts.

law right

One of

incurred by a person

of

the most
who has

been given and has used alcohol.

The statutes may have

provisions for a tort right of action.
courts must, of course, comply.

express

When such statutes exact,

Miller v. City of Portland.

604

P.2d 1261, 1264-1265 (Or. 1980).
On
most

the other

often contain no

hand, regulatory
express provision

and

criminal statutes

for a right

of action

and, where courts have established no common law rights under the
circumstances

governed

by

the statutes,

a

different

problem is posed from the negligence per se situation.
In such cases, courts attempt to determine
intent as to
to them;

kind of
Id.

legislative

civil liability from whatever sources are available

and, if determinable, courts

follow that intent.

The

most usual sources of information are the language of the statute
itself

including

the

title
If

and

preamble,

these

sources

legislative

history.

legislative

intent, courts usually

the problem was not contemplated
had no specific intent.

as

well

fail

come to the

to

as

disclose

conclusion that

by the legislature and that

In such a state of affairs,

still make a decision and they then attempt to

the

it

courts must

ascertain how the

legislature would have dealt with the situation had it considered
the

problem.

giving birth

This is

usually done

by looking

at the

policy

to the statute and determining whether a civil tort

action is needed to carry out that policy.
20

Id.

Title 32A, Chapter
of Utah's liquor

laws.

12 deals with criminal

Civil

tort action

enforcement

is not necessary

to

carry out that policy of criminal enforcement, except such action
as provided by the Utah Dram Shop Act to third persons.
There is nothing

in Chapter

Legislature

contemplated civil

corporation

that provided alcohol

12 to

liability of

injured himself while inebriated.

indicate that

the

an association

or

to an intoxicated

person who

There is nothing in Chapter 12

to indicate that the legislature had a specific intent to protect
an intoxicated person from himself.
To invoke the rule that violation of a statute is prima
facie evidence of negligence, a party must show (1) the existence
of the

statute or ordinance, (2)

was intended to protect the
party,

(3) that the

that the statute

or ordinance

class of persons which includes

protection is

directed toward the

the

type of

harm which has in fact occurred as a result of the violation, and
(4) that the violation of the ordinance or statute as a proximate
cause of
850.

the injury complained of.

Hall

v. Warren. 632 P.2d at

See alsxi, Knapstad v, Smith's Management Corp., 774 P.2d 1,

2 (Utah App. 1989).
In
existence of

his Brief

of

Appellant

Section 32A-12-9 (1986).

of his Brief of Appellant:
21

only,

Horton

shows

the

Horton asserts on page 20

Since our state
legislature
enacted Utah Code Ann. section (sic) 32A-129 (1986) concerning the sale or supply of
alcoholic beverages or products to a drunken
person, one would assume that there was
legislative intention to address the issue of
supplying alcohol to intoxicated persons.
This then would indicate that this statute,
not the Dramshop Act, would control the
instant case and that our legislature has
recognized
the
intoxicated
party
and
established duties as regards that party.
This circular reasoning fails to
(3) have

been met,

show that requirements (2)

even if they

Complaint, which they were not.
who voluntarily consumes

had been

alleged in

and

Horton's

Furthermore, an adult individual

intoxicants and then, by reason

of his

inebriated

condition, injures himself is excluded from the class

protected

by

beverages

to a

a

statute

visibly

prohibiting

the

sale

intoxicated person.

of

alcoholic

Cuevas v.

Roval

D'lherville Hotel. 498 So.2d 346 (Miss. 1986).
Horton

fails to allege

violation

of Section 32A-12-9

the Sun.

Horton fails to allege

in his Complaint

(1986) by either

the criminal

Studebaker's or

that any such violation

was a

proximate cause of his alleged injuries.
Section 32A-12-13.3, Utah Code Ann. (1986) provides:
No person may purchase any alcoholic
beverage or product when he is under the
influence
of
intoxicating
alcoholic
beverages, products, or drugs.

22

According to Horton's intoxicating reasoning,
of this criminal

statute one could

assume that the

has recognized the intoxicated party's
violating his established duties

from the existence
legislature

right to sue himself

to himself.

Such a

for

conclusion

is as ludicrous as Horton's conclusion that criminal Section 32A12-9

(1986) gives him a

injuries he

suffered

cause of action

as the

result of

against a dramshop for
the

"state of

extreme

intoxication" he "achieved."
The
Complaint
against

lower

stated

no

court

statutory or

Studebaker's or the Sun

suffered as the result of
Court

correctly determined

should affirm

common-law

that
cause

Horton's
of action

for the alleged injuries Horton

his own voluntary intoxication.

the lower

court's Order of

This

Dismissal with

Prejudice and on the Merits.
CONCLUSION
The Utah legislature's decision to preclude recovery by
the intoxicated is certainly supported by strong public policy:
A rule of liability here could have no other
possible
effect
upon
patrons
than to
encourage
them
to
excessive
liquor
consumption at taverns. Forthwith upon the
announcement of a rule of law which permits a
drunken patron to recover damages for his own
injuries from the tavern keeper, patrons who
have heretofore felt concern for their own
safety should they become overly intoxicated
will relax their personal efforts, for three
readily apparent reasons.
First, because
they will assume that the bartenders will
23

exercise
greater care on
their behalf;
second, because they very naturally will feel
that if
they
are hurt
they will
be
compensated for such hurt; and third, because
we . . . will in effect have encouraged their
over
indulgence,
by
pampering
their
delinquency.
It cannot be otherwise.
The
already tragic statistics which so horribly
describe the slaughter of innocent persons by
drunk drivers will immediately increase, to
society's further disadvantage.
Tovar v. Lee. Civil No. 84-1540

at 4-5 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting

Kindt v, Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d

845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 611-

12 (1976)).
Horton states no facts in his Complaint setting forth a
claim

under either

Horton

was

the Utah Dram

injured

as

a

Shop Act

result

of

the

or the

common law.

"State

of

extreme

intoxication" he "achieved."
If

the Legislature

overindulgence
cause of
result

of

business.

by

sees

rewarding the

fit

foolishly

action against dram shops
voluntary

to encourage

intoxicated

with a

for injuries sustained

inebriation,

Until and unless that

alcoholic

that

is

the

as a

Legislature's

happens, this Court

must hold

that in Utah there is no cause of action

against a dram shop for

injuries

adult's

suffered

as a

result

of

an

own

voluntary

intoxication.
This Court

should affirm

the lower

Dismissal with Prejudice and on the merits.
24

court's Order

of

DATED this 30th day of September, 1990.
Respectfully

VTRGIXW CURTIS LEE
Attorney on Appeal for Appellee
The Royal Order of the Sun
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Shawn E. Draney
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10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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w wno is a Known interdicted person,
and by those actions causes the intoxication of that person, is liable for injuries in person, property, or means of support to any third person, or to the
spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from the intoxication.
An employer is liable for the actions of its employees in violation of this
chapter.
(2) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) has a cause of
action against the person who provided the liquor or other alcoholic beverage
in violation of Subsection (1).
(3) If a person having rights or liabilities under this chapter dies, the rights
or liabilities provided by this chapter survive to or against that person's estate.
(4) The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any person pursuant to a cause of action under this chapter which arises after the effective date
of this subsection is limited to $100,000 and the aggregate amount which may
be awarded to all persons injured as a result of one occurrence is limited to
$300,000.
(5) An action based upon a cause of action under this chapter which arises
after the effective date of this subsection shall be commenced within two years
after the date of the injury.
(6) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of action or additional
recovery against the person causing the injury.
(7) (a) A sanction or termination of employment may not be imposed upon
any employee of any restaurant, club, or any other facility serving alcoholic beverages as a result of the employee having exercised the employee's independent judgment to refuse to sell alcoholic beverages to any
person the employee considers to meet one or more of the conditions
described in Subsection (1).
(b) Any employer who terminates an employee or imposes sanctions on
the employee contrary to this section is considered to have discriminated
against that employee and is subject to the conditions and penalties set
forth in Chapter 35, Title 34, the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act.
History: C. 1953, 32A-14-1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1986, ch. 177, § 3; 1989,
ch. 240, § 1.

Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, added Subsection (7) and made minor stylistic changes.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AJLR. — Intoxicating liquors: employer's li- third parties as a result of intoxicated guest's
ability for furnishing or permitting liquor on negligence, 62 A.L.R.4th 16.
social occasion, 51 A.L.R.4th 1048.
Passenger's liability to vehicular accident
Social host's liability for injuries incurred by victim for harm caused by intoxicated motor
vehicle driver, 64 A.L.R4th 272.

32A-14-2. Immunity of state, state agencies and employees, and political subdivisions.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Section
32A-13-2. Arrests.

32A-13-2. Arrests [Effective July 1, 1990].
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, all arrests of persons for any
violation of this title are in accordance with Chapter 7, Title 77, Utah Code of
Criminal Procedure, and Rules 6 and 7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
All summons in lieu of warrants of arrest are in accordance with Rule 6, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
History: C. 1953, 32A-13-2, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 1.
Amended effective July 1, 1990. — Laws
1989, ch. 187, § 1 amends this section effective
July 1, 1990. See amendment note below.

Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective July 1,1990, substituted references to the Rules of Criminal Procedure for
references to Chapter 35 of Title 77.

CHAPTER 14
DRAMSHOP LIABILITY
Section
32A-14-1. Liability for injuries resulting from
illegal sale or other distribution of
alcoholic beverages — Injured person's cause of action against persons who provided alcoholic beverage — Survival of action — Limi-

tation on damages — Statute of
limitations — Employee may not
be disciplined or fired for refusing
to serve alcoholic beverage to
minor or intoxicated or interdicted
person.

32A-14-1. Liability for injuries resulting from illegal sale
or other distribution of alcoholic beverages — Injured person's cause of action against persons
who provided alcoholic beverage — Survival of
action — Limitation on damages — Statute of limitations — Employee may not be disciplined or
fired for refusing to serve alcoholic beverage to
minor or intoxicated or interdicted person.
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or at a
location allowing consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, to a
person:
(a) who is under the age of 21 years, or
(b) who is apparently under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs, or
(c) whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage knew or should
have known from the circumstances was under the influence of intoxicat-

